A License is Not a 'Contract Not to Sue': Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses
A License is Not a 'Contract Not to Sue': Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses
复制标题
许可不是“不起诉合同”：在版权许可法中解开财产和合同
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2010853
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Christopher M. Newman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christopher M. Newman
“许可”只是一份“不起诉合同”的说法在版权法和专利法中已变得司空见惯。我认为这个概念在概念上是有缺陷的，并且已经成为将法学推理引入非生产性渠道的束缚。从根本上讲，许可不是合同，而是财产权益的一种形式。它可能与一系列契约关系紧密地交织在一起，但其性质和后果不能仅从契约主义的世界中得到令人满意的解释。在本文中，我试图解释财产权和合同学说在创造我们称为“许可”的各种形式的合法权益方面所发挥的互补但平行的作用。每个学说都有自己的一套管理程序，为所有权人提供各种手段来创建和保护授予他人的使用特权，同时仍然保留自己的剩余所有权。我认为，澄清许可在多大程度上是财产而非合同法赋予的权力的行使，为正确适用 1976 年《版权法》第 204 条提供了关键，该条被（错误地）解释为管辖合同形成的欺诈法规，而不是管辖特定形式的财产转让的法规。
The assertion that a 'license' is simply a 'contract not to sue' has become a commonplace in both copyright and patent law. I argue that this notion is conceptually flawed, and has become a straightjacket channeling juristic reasoning into unproductive channels. At root, a license is not a contract, but a form of property interest. It may be closely intertwined with a set of contractual relationships, but its nature and consequences cannot be satisfactorily explained from within the world of contract doctrine alone. In this article, I seek to explain the complementary but parallel roles played by property and contract doctrine in creation of the various forms of legal interests we refer to as 'licenses.' Each doctrine has its own set of governing formalities that afford titleholders various means through which to create and protect use privileges granted to others, while still retaining residual title for themselves. I argue that clarifying the extent to which licenses are exercises of powers conferred by property rather than contract law provides a key to proper application of Section 204 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which has been (erroneously) construed as a statute of frauds governing contract formation, as opposed to one governing a specific form of property conveyance.