Bounded-Communication Leakage Resilience via Parity-Resilient Circuits

Bounded-Communication Leakage Resilience via Parity-Resilient Circuits
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通过奇偶校验弹性电路实现有界通信泄漏弹性

DOI:
10.1109/focs.2016.10
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发表时间:
2016
期刊:
2016 IEEE 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Alexander A. Sherstov
Alexander A. Sherstov
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
Vipul Goyal;Yuval Ishai;H. K. Maji;A. Sahai;Alexander A. Sherstov

文献摘要

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我们考虑在两方之间分配计算的问题,使得应用于双方的局部视图的任何有界通信泄漏函数基本上不显示任何关于输入的信息。这个问题的动机可能是将敏感数据的计算外包给云中的两台服务器,这两台服务器可能同时被通信带宽有限的病毒破坏。我们提出了一个简单而有效的减少上述问题,构建奇偶弹性电路,即电路,映射编码的输入到编码的输出,使任何子集的电线的奇偶校验基本上是独立的输入。然后,我们构建奇偶弹性电路的电路,是弹性的本地泄漏,这反过来又可以从安全多方计算协议。我们的主要减少建立在一个新的推广的ε-偏置掩蔽引理,适用于交互式协议。应用上述内容,我们获得了两方协议,无论是在信息理论环境中,依赖于随机不经意传输相关性,或在计算环境中,依赖于非提交加密,它可以基于各种标准的密码学假设的有界通信泄漏的弹性。
We consider the problem of distributing a computation between two parties, such that any bounded-communication leakage function applied to the local views of the two parties reveals essentially nothing about the input. This problem can be motivated by the goal of outsourcing computations on sensitive data to two servers in the cloud, where both servers can be simultaneously corrupted by viruses that have a limited communication bandwidth. We present a simple and efficient reduction of the above problem to that of constructing parity-resilient circuits, namely circuits that map an encoded input to an encoded output so that the parity of any subset of the wires is essentially independent of the input. We then construct parity-resilient circuits from circuits that are resilient to local leakage, which can in turn be obtained from protocols for secure multiparty computation. Our main reduction builds on a novel generalization of the ε-biased masking lemma that applies to interactive protocols. Applying the above, we obtain two-party protocols with resilience to bounded-communication leakage either in the information-theoretic setting, relying on random oblivious transfer correlations, or in the computational setting, relying on non-committing encryption which can be based on a variety of standard cryptographic assumptions.