Equilibrium in Preemption Games with Complete Information
Equilibrium in Preemption Games with Complete Information
复制标题
完全信息抢占博弈中的均衡
DOI：
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发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Charles A. Wilson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Hendricks;Charles A. Wilson
一个公司采用一项新技术的回报往往取决于它与其他公司相比何时采用这项技术。大多数研究都集中在这样的市场上，即企业有先发制人的动机，但首选的结果是等待，要么在稍后的某个日期采用，要么根本不采用。关键问题是公司能够在多大程度上协调其采用日期并从延迟采用中赚取一些利润。在Farrell和Saloner（1986）、Fudenberg和Tirole（1985）以及吉尔伯特和Harris（1984）所研究的模型中，企业通常无法获得任何这些收益。优先购买的动机导致了一个类似Bertrand的结果，其中一家公司肯定会在优先购买的收益为正时立即采用。在某些情况下，模型也具有均衡，其中企业能够实现首选的结果。福登伯格和梯若尔指出，当抢占的收益很小时，存在一个连续的均衡，企业在稍后的某个日期联合采用该均衡。法雷尔和塞隆纳得到了类似的结果，只是在他们的情况下，首选的结果是两家公司都不会采用。
The returns to a firm from adopting a new technology frequently depend on when it adopts it relative to other firms. Most studies focus on markets in which firms have an incentive to adopt preemptively, but where the preferred outcome is to wait and either adopt at some later date or never adopt at all. The critical issue is the extent to which firms can coordinate their adoption dates and earn some of the profits from delayed adoption. In the models considered by Farrell and Saloner (1986), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), and Gilbert and Harris (1984), firms generally fail to obtain any of these gains. The incentive for preemption leads to a Bertrand-like outcome in which one firm is certain to adopt as soon as the gains from preemption are positive. In some instances, the models also possess equilibria in which the firms are able to achieve the preferred outcome. Fudenberg and Tirole note that when the gains from preemption are small, there is a continuum of equilibria in which firms adopt jointly at some later date. Farrell and Saloner obtain a similar result, only in their case the preferred outcome is that neither firm ever adopts.