Strategic Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice: Partial Delegation or Full Delegation
Strategic Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice: Partial Delegation or Full Delegation
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02179.x
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发表时间：
2011-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yoshihiro Tomaru;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Masayuki Saito
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yoshihiro Tomaru;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Masayuki Saito
考虑企业所有权与经营权分离的情况下，本文分析了混合双寡头垄断下的企业能力选择问题。我们将以下两种替代方案作为每个公司对其经理的授权类型：(i)部分授权-仅授权数量设置，以及（ii）完全授权-授权确定容量和数量水平。首先，在给定委托类型的情况下，我们研究了每家企业相对于其数量的产能规模。其次，导出了在企业所有者内生决策下各企业的均衡委托类型。最后，我们考虑了私有化对各企业委托类型和社会福利的影响。
In this paper we analyze the capacity choice in a mixed duopoly, considering the separation between ownership and management of firms. We introduce the following two alternatives as each firm's delegation type to its manager: (i) partial delegation - delegating only the quantity setting, and (ii) full delegation - delegating the determination of both capacity and quantity levels. First, we investigate each firm's capacity scale relative to its quantity, given its delegation type. Second, we derive the equilibrium delegation type of each firm under the endogenous decision by its owner. Finally, we consider the effect of privatization on each firm's delegation type and social welfare.