Two virtue ethics and the anthropology of morality

Two virtue ethics and the anthropology of morality
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二德伦理学与道德人类学

DOI:
10.1177/1463499612455284
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发表时间:
2012
影响因子:
1.7
通讯作者:
C. Mattingly
C. Mattingly
中科院分区:
法学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
C. Mattingly

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最近,有人呼吁对道德进行人类学研究,并对人类学家提出了挑战,认为他们对社会生活中的道德方面关注不够。新的道德人类学试图修改与涂尔干有关的遗产,并将道德限制在不加反思的规范遵循的观念上。由此产生了对美德伦理学的新兴趣。在这篇文章中,我考察了“第一人称”或“人文主义”美德伦理学与主要受福柯启发的结构主义美德伦理学之间的共同点和关键区别。尽管后结构主义和第一人称的美德伦理学有许多趋同之处,但它们不仅提出了截然不同的主张,而且在某些情况下还提出了不可调和的主张。与其急于合并这些职位,我会敦促我们停下来看看它们有何不同,看看为什么这场辩论可能会对我们自己的人种学企业产生重要影响。
There has been a recent call for an anthropology of morality and a challenge to anthropologists that they have been insufficiently attentive to moral aspects of social life. The new anthropology of morality involves an attempt to modify the legacy associated with Durkheim and the idea of the moral as confined to unreflective norm following. Out of this has emerged a new interest in virtue ethics. In this paper, I examine points of convergence and crucial differences between a ‘first-person’ or ‘humanist’ virtue ethics and a postructural one inspired largely by Foucault. Despite their many convergences, poststructural and first-person versions of virtue ethics make not only distinct but in some cases irreconcilable claims. Instead of rushing to merge these positions, I would urge that we pause to look at how they differ and see why this debate might matter to our own ethnographic enterprises.
DOI: 10.1080/1355785022000038560
发表时间: 2002
期刊: Ethnicity & health.
影响因子: --
作者:
Frayne,SusanM;Crawford,SybilL;McGraw,SarahA;Smith,KevinW;McKinlay,JohnB
通讯作者: McKinlay,JohnB