The Perils of Relying on Interested Parties to Evaluate Scientific Quality
The Perils of Relying on Interested Parties to Evaluate Scientific Quality
复制标题
依赖利益相关方评估科学质量的危险
DOI：
10.2105/ajph.2004.044792
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Wendy E. Wagner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wendy E. Wagner
最近，在民事诉讼和监管法律中出现了一种趋势，即通过利用利益集团评估科学质量的对抗性过程来规避科学界对个别研究质量的集体判断。最高法院的Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals，Inc意见和国会最近通过的两项“良好科学”法律采用了受影响方告知的对抗程序，以审查和筛选科学质量。这些发展是不明智的。理论和经验都表明，一种对抗性的、利益集团主导的评估科学质量的方法将导致对科学的非生产性解构，进一步模糊政策和科学判断之间的区别，并导致糟糕的决定，因为主持这些“好的科学”竞赛的法院和机构有时缺乏做出正确决定所需的科学能力。
Recently, there has been a trend in both civil litigation and regulatory law to circumvent the scientific community's collective judgment on the quality of individual studies with an adversarial process of evaluating scientific quality using interest groups. The Supreme Court's Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc opinion and two recent "good science" laws passed by Congress adopt an adversarial process informed by affected parties for reviewing and screening scientific quality. These developments are unwise. Both theory and experience instruct that an adversarial, interest group-dominated approach to evaluating scientific quality will lead to the unproductive deconstruction of science, further blur the distinction between policy and scientific judgments, and result in poor decisions because the courts and agencies that preside over these "good science" contests sometimes lack the scientific competency needed to make sound decisions.
影响因子：
158.5
作者：
DOCKERY, DW;POPE, CA;SPEIZER, FE
通讯作者：
SPEIZER, FE