An eavesdropping and jamming dilemma with sophisticated players
An eavesdropping and jamming dilemma with sophisticated players
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DOI：
10.1016/j.icte.2022.06.002
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发表时间：
2022-06
期刊：
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
A. Garnaev;W. Trappe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Garnaev;W. Trappe
无线网络容易受到恶意攻击，特别是那些涉及窃听和干扰的攻击。在本文中，我们考虑一个通信场景，涉及一个发射机谁希望秘密和可靠地与接收机进行通信，而对手希望通过窃听或干扰来阻碍这种通信。发送者和对手都希望以一种对对手来说尽可能不可预测的方式实现自己的目标。我们用一个非零和博弈来模拟这个问题。该算法将秘密地、无干扰地发送给接收方的期望吞吐量作为反映通信保密性和可靠性的度量。参与人策略的熵被认为是反映参与人不可预测性的度量。平衡被发现在封闭的形式，和参数的发射机的效用支持这两个目标是通过比例公平的方法进行优化。
Wireless networks are susceptible to malicious attacks, especially those involving eavesdropping and jamming. In this paper, we consider a communication scenario involving a transmitter who wishes to communicate secretly and reliably with a receiver, while an adversary wants to obstruct this communication by means of either eavesdropping or jamming. The transmitter as well as the adversary wants to achieve its own goal in a manner that is as unpredictable as possible to its rival. We model this problem by a non-zero sum game. The expected throughput that is delivered secretly and non-jammed to the receiver is considered as the metric that reflects communication secrecy and reliability. The entropy of the player’s strategies is considered as the metric to reflect the player’s unpredictability. The equilibrium is found in closed form, and parameters of the transmitter’s utility supporting both goals are optimized via a proportional fairness approach.