Risk aversion and generation adequacy in liberalized electricity markets: Benefits of capacity markets
Risk aversion and generation adequacy in liberalized electricity markets: Benefits of capacity markets
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自由化电力市场中的风险规避和发电充足性：容量市场的好处
DOI：
10.1109/eem.2016.7521264
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Rious
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Abani;Nicolas Hary;M. Saguan;V. Rious
本文分析了投资者的风险厌恶对发电容量投资的影响。在两种不同的市场设计，即竞争性的能源市场和容量市场的影响进行了研究。一个仿真模型，基于系统动力学，其中风险厌恶的投资者和不确定的峰值负荷的代表，是用于这一目的。结果进行了讨论的有效性和效率的研究市场设计的影响。市场设计的有效性被定义为避免短缺的能力，效率与总发电成本有关。当比较两种市场设计的性能在风险规避的情况下，容量市场被证明是更强大的，特别是关于有效性。此外，研究结果表明，在存在风险厌恶的投资者，实施容量市场产生更高的收益，相比风险中性的情况。
This paper analyzes the impact of investors' risk aversion on investments in generation capacity. This effect is investigated in two different market designs, namely a competitive energy-only market and a capacity market. A simulation model, based on system dynamics, in which risk averse investors and an uncertain peak load are represented, is used to this end. The results are discussed in terms of impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the studied market designs. The effectiveness of a market design is defined as its ability to avoid shortages and the efficiency is linked to the total generation costs. When comparing the performances of the two market designs in a situation of risk aversion, the capacity market proves to be more robust, especially regarding effectiveness. Furthermore, the results suggest that, in presence of risk averse investors, implementing a capacity market yields even higher benefits, compared to a risk neutral situation.