Putting the Lid on Lobbying: Tariff Structure and Long-Term Growth When Protection is for Sale
Putting the Lid on Lobbying: Tariff Structure and Long-Term Growth When Protection is for Sale
复制标题
遏制游说：保护出售时的关税结构和长期增长
DOI：
10.3386/w12164
复制
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Daniel Trefler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nathan Nunn;Daniel Trefler
人们早就认识到，一国的关税是寻租游戏的内生结果，其均衡反映了国家制度。因此，各行业的关税结构可以让我们深入了解关税政策所反映的制度如何影响长期增长。我们从政客们的一个普遍看法开始，即对技能密集型产业的保护会产生促进增长的外部性。修改Grossman-Helpman保护销售模型以允许这种情况，我们做出两个预测。首先，一个拥有良好制度的国家将容忍高平均关税，只要关税偏向技能密集型产业。第二，平均关税和良好的制度之间不一定有任何关系。通过对59个国家17个制造业行业近25年的数据分析，我们发现平均关税与产出增长不相关，关税结构的技能偏向与产出增长正相关。我们认为，这意味着，如果一个国家能够并愿意遏制特殊利益游说集团的寻租行为，那么它们的增长就会更快。我们发现，我们的结果与以下解释不一致：（1）外部性本身，（2）最初的产业结构偏向于技能密集型产业，或（3）更广泛的制度，如法治和腐败控制的影响。
It has long been recognized that a country's tariffs are the endogenous outcome of a rent-seeking game whose equilibrium reflects national institutions. Thus, the structure of tariffs across industries provides insights into how institutions, as reflected in tariff policies, affect long-term growth. We start with the commonplace perception among politicians that protection of skill-intensive industries generates a growth-enhancing externality. Modifying the Grossman-Helpman protection for sale model to allow for this, we make two predictions. First, a country with good institutions will tolerate high average tariffs provided tariffs are biased towards skill-intensive industries. Second, there need not be any relationship between average tariffs and good institutions. Using data for 17 manufacturing industries in 59 countries over approximately 25 years, we find that average tariffs are uncorrelated with output growth and that the skill-bias of tariff structure is positively correlated with output growth. We interpret this to mean that countries grow faster if they are able and willing to put a lid on the rent-seeking behaviour of special interest lobby groups. We show that our results are not compatible with explanations that appeal to (1) externalities per se, (2) initial industrial structure that is skewed towards skill-intensive industries, or (3) the effects of broader institutions such as rule of law and control of corruption.
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3595
发表时间：
1998-03
期刊：
Macroeconomics eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
R. Hall;C. I. Jones
通讯作者：
R. Hall;C. I. Jones