Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies
Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies
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六个总统制民主国家的选票激励措施和立法代表权
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00278.x
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Taylor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brian F. Crisp;María C. Escobar;Bradford S. Jones;M. Jones;M. Taylor
通过使用原始数据集的法案启动活动，在六个总统制民主国家，我们推进学术了解立法候选人所面临的制度激励如何影响代表性。我们扩展和适应理论，主要来自美国国会的经验，证明其可行性，一旦假设常数从美国的情况下明确建模，在相当不同的制度背景。特别是，我们发现，个别立法者对国家与教区的关注的重点响应的激励措施所提供的候选人的选择过程中，大选规则，立法者的职业模式，和分支机构间的关系。
Through the use of an original data set of bill initiation activity in six presidential democracies, we advance scholarly understanding of how the institutional incentives faced by legislative candidates influence representation. We extend and adapt theory, derived primarily from the experience of the U.S. Congress, demonstrating its viability, once assumed constants from the U.S. case are explicitly modeled, in quite distinct institutional contexts. In particular, we find the focus of individual legislators on national versus parochial concerns responds to the incentives provided by the candidate selection process, general election rules, legislator career patterns, and interbranch relations.