Implicit theories and conceptions of morality
Implicit theories and conceptions of morality
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DOI：
10.1037/0022-3514.73.5.923
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发表时间：
1997-11-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Fu, JHY
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chiu, CY;Dweck, CS;Fu, JHY
在这篇文章中，作者提出，个人的道德信念与他们关于自然的内隐理论有关（即，具体来说，有人假设，当个人相信一个固定的现实（实体理论），他们倾向于持有道德信仰，其中给定系统内的义务被视为基本。相反，当个人相信一个可延展的现实（增量理论），一个可以由个人塑造的现实时，他们持有的道德信仰专注于道德原则，如人权，现实应该围绕这些原则组织起来。5项研究的结果支持提出的框架：内隐理论的可塑性的一个人的社会道德现实预测的义务为基础的与权利为基础的道德信念。
In this article, the authors propose that individuals' moral beliefs are linked to their implicit theories about the nature (i.e., malleability) of their social-moral reality Specifically, it was hypothesized that when individuals believe in a fixed reality (entity theory), they tend to hold moral beliefs in which duties within the given system are seen as fundamental. In contrast, when individuals believe in a malleable reality (incremental theory), one that can be shaped by individuals, they hold moral beliefs that focus on moral principles, such as human rights, around which that reality should be organized. Results from 5 studies supported the proposed framework: Implicit theories about the malleability of one's social-moral reality predicted duty-based vs. rights-based moral beliefs.