Parameterization of equilibrium assessment in Bayesian game with its application to belief computation
Parameterization of equilibrium assessment in Bayesian game with its application to belief computation
复制标题
DOI:
10.1109/cdc.2016.7798812
复制
发表时间:
2016-12
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
K. Kogiso;Takashi Suzuki
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
K. Kogiso;Takashi Suzuki
In this paper, the authors show that for a certain kind of Bayesian games, there exists parametric representation in terms of an equilibrium assessment, a pair of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and a corresponding belief. The parameterization can be derived from a steady-state analysis of a deterministic state-space model that transfers from the equilibrium assessment to one. The resulting parameterization is expressed in fractional form and its ratio is unchanged by transitions of the equilibrium assessment. Owing to the constant ratio, the parameterization enables belief computation using a given or measured BNE as a game outcome. A numerical example confirms the validity and usefulness of the parameterization.