Vendor Certification and Appraisal: Implications for Supplier Quality
Vendor Certification and Appraisal: Implications for Supplier Quality
复制标题
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1060.0557
复制
发表时间：
2006-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Iny Hwang;S. Radhakrishnan;L. Su
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Iny Hwang;S. Radhakrishnan;L. Su
我们研究买方的问题，诱导供应商的质量努力使用两种安排：评估制度和认证制度。在估价制度中，买方检查所供应的单位，对检查期间发现的有缺陷的单位收取罚款，或支付良好单位的单价。在认证制度中，供应商获得供应商认证，买方为所供应的所有单位支付单价。检验技术和认证过程提供了关于供应商质量努力的嘈杂信息。在评价制度中，买方执行供应商的高质量和低检查。由于额外的代理成本，供应商的预期利润大于其保留利润：买方必须防止供应商进行不必要的/先发制人的检查（这会导致延迟等间接成本）。这种额外的代理费用恰恰是在检查的效率很高时产生的。这就为越来越多地使用认证（如ISO 9000）提供了一个基于道德危害的理由，尽管（事实上是因为）检查的效力越来越大。买方在评估制度中可能产生额外的代理费用，这突出表明了与检查有关的间接费用。
We examine the buyer's problem of inducing the supplier's quality effort using two arrangements: the appraisal regime and the certification regime. In the appraisal regime, the buyer inspects the units supplied and either charges a penalty for defective units identified during inspection or pays the unit price for good units. In the certification regime, the supplier obtains vendor certification and the buyer pays the unit price for all units supplied. The inspection technology and the certification process provide noisy information on the supplier's quality effort. In the appraisal regime, the buyer implements the supplier's high-quality and low-inspection. The supplier's expected profit is greater than his reservation profit because of an additional agency cost: The buyer has to prevent the supplier from performing unwanted/preemptive inspection (which gives rise to indirect costs from delay, etc.). This additional agency cost arises precisely when the effectiveness of inspection is high. This provides a moral-hazard-based rationale for the increasing use of certification (such as ISO 9000) in spite of (in fact, because of) the increasing effectiveness of inspection. The potential for additional agency cost incurred by the buyer in the appraisal regime highlights an indirect cost associated with inspection.