Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems
Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems
复制标题
针对 McEliece 和 Niederreiter 公钥密码系统的旁道攻击
DOI:
10.1007/s13389-011-0024-9
复制
发表时间:
2011
影响因子:
1.9
通讯作者:
Avanzi R
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Avanzi R
Research within “post-quantum” cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by Strenzke et al. (Side channels in the McEliece PKC, vol. 5299, pp. 216–229, 2008), and novel countermeasures against such attack.
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2007
期刊:
ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
影响因子:
--
作者:
R. Avanzi
通讯作者:
R. Avanzi
DOI:
--
发表时间:
1996
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
K. Huber
通讯作者:
K. Huber