External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities
External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities
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外部叛乱分子赞助和平民虐待：战时暴行的委托代理分析
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Reed M. Wood
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Idean Salehyan;David S. Siroky;Reed M. Wood
摘要 尽管一些反叛组织努力与平民建立合作关系，但其他组织却犯下令人震惊的虐待行为和战争罪行。我们认为，外国对叛乱组织的资助大大降低了“赢得民心”的动力，因为它减少了从民众那里收集资源的需要。然而，与其他利润丰厚的资源不同，外国对反叛组织的资助必须从委托代理的角度来理解。一些外部主体——即民主国家和拥有强大人权游说团体的国家——比其他国家更关心冲突地区的暴行。多个国家负责人也会导致滥用行为，因为没有一个国家能够有效地限制该组织。我们用外国支持反叛组织的新数据和针对平民的片面暴力数据来检验这些猜想。最值得注意的是，我们发现强有力的证据表明主要特征有助于影响代理人的行为。
Abstract Although some rebel groups work hard to foster collaborative ties with civilians, others engage in egregious abuses and war crimes. We argue that foreign state funding for rebel organizations greatly reduces incentives to “win the hearts and minds” of civilians because it diminishes the need to collect resources from the population. However, unlike other lucrative resources, foreign funding of rebel groups must be understood in principal-agent terms. Some external principals—namely, democracies and states with strong human rights lobbies—are more concerned with atrocities in the conflict zone than others. Multiple state principals also lead to abuse because no single state can effectively restrain the organization. We test these conjectures with new data on foreign support for rebel groups and data on one-sided violence against civilians. Most notably, we find strong evidence that principal characteristics help influence agent actions.