Incomplete cooperation and co-benefits: deepening climate cooperation with a proliferation of small agreements
Incomplete cooperation and co-benefits: deepening climate cooperation with a proliferation of small agreements
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DOI：
10.1007/s10584-015-1511-2
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发表时间：
2017-09-01
期刊：
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Pacheco, Jorge M.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hannam, Phillip M.;Vasconcelos, Vitor V.;Pacheco, Jorge M.
案例研究和模型结果使人们对具有部分排他性公益物的小型联盟的潜力感到乐观，这些联盟有可能大大深化能源和气候问题上的国际合作。从核不扩散、跨境空气污染和自由化贸易等国际关系中的其他问题领域汲取动力，我们使用进化博弈论模型来分析产生国内激励以促进公共产品提供（共同利益）的制度。共同利益可能有限，但可以为形成联盟创造一个核心，这些联盟在深化提供全球公益物的同时不断壮大。气候和清洁空气联盟（CCAC）是一个典型的例子，它利用部分可排除的俱乐部利益来深化非二氧化碳温室气体方面的合作。我们的博弈论的结果支持两个重要的见解积木式的方法来应对气候变化：俱乐部协议的持续合作是可能的，即使公共产品不完全排除和人口中的一些成员搭便车;第二，在小俱乐部配置的合作产生更大的非排他性的公共产品的好处比合作更具包容性的论坛。本文件提供了积极的支持，即在《气候公约》的积木式方法下增加小型协议可能比完全包容的方法更有效（而不仅仅是更有可能）深化气候变化合作。
Case study and model results lend some optimism for the potential of small coalitions with partially excludable public goods to substantially deepen international cooperation on energy and climate issues. Drawing motivation from other issue areas in international relations ranging from nuclear non-proliferation, transboundary air pollution and liberalized trade, we use an evolutionary-game-theoretic model to analyze regimes that yield domestic incentives to contribute to public goods provision (co-benefits). Co-benefits may be limited, but can create a nucleus for formation of coalitions that grow while deepening provision of global public goods. The Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) is a prime example of an agreement that employs partially excludable club benefits to deepen cooperation on non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Our game-theoretic results support two important insights for the building blocks approach to addressing climate change: sustained cooperation in club agreements is possible even when public goods are not entirely excludable and some members of the population free-ride; and second, cooperation in small club configurations yields larger non-excludable public goods benefits than cooperation in more inclusive forums. This paper lends positive support that a proliferation of small agreements under a building blocks approach at the UNFCCC may be more effective (not just more likely) for deepening climate change cooperation than a fully inclusive approach.