An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
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统一规则的另一种描述
DOI：
10.1007/bf00179209
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
S. Ching
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Ching
我们考虑了在一组具有单峰偏好的代理人之间分配一定数量的商品的问题。我们证明了统一规则是满足平等待遇、帕累托有效性和无策略性的唯一规则。这一特征加强了Sprumont(1991)的两个有趣的结果。我们的证明方法只涉及基本论点。
We consider the problem of allocating some amount of a commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness. This characterization strengthens two interesting results due to Sprumont (1991). Our method of proof involves only elementary arguments.