Stochasticity, Selection, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Two-Level Moran Model of the Snowdrift Game
Stochasticity, Selection, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Two-Level Moran Model of the Snowdrift Game
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DOI：
10.1155/2018/9836150
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发表时间：
2018-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Loewe, Laurence
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
McLoone, Brian;Fan, Wai-Tong Louis;Loewe, Laurence
雪堆博弈，也被称为鹰鸽博弈，是一种社会困境，其中个人可以参与（合作）或不参与（背叛）生产公共产品。它与生物学中的一些集体行动问题有关。在一个群体中的个人玩这个游戏，传统的进化模型，其中的动态是连续的和确定性的，预测一个稳定的，内部平衡的合作者的频率。在这里，我们研究如何有限的人口规模和多级选择影响在这个游戏中使用两级莫兰过程，其中涉及离散的，随机的动态合作的演变。我们的分析有两个主要结果。首先，我们发现，多级选择在这个模型中可以产生显着更高的合作水平比传统的模型中发现。其次，我们确定了一个阈值效应的支付矩阵在雪堆游戏中，这样，低于（以上）一个确定的成本效益比，合作几乎肯定会修复（灭绝）的人口。这第二个结果质疑传统的连续模型的解释范围，并提出了一个可能的替代解释高水平的合作行为的性质。
The Snowdrift Game, also known as the Hawk-Dove Game, is a social dilemma in which an individual can participate (cooperate) or not (defect) in producing a public good. It is relevant to a number of collective action problems in biology. In a population of individuals playing this game, traditional evolutionary models, in which the dynamics are continuous and deterministic, predict a stable, interior equilibrium frequency of cooperators. Here, we examine how finite population size and multilevel selection affect the evolution of cooperation in this game using a two-level Moran process, which involves discrete, stochastic dynamics. Our analysis has two main results. First, we find that multilevel selection in this model can yield significantly higher levels of cooperation than one finds in traditional models. Second, we identify a threshold effect for the payoff matrix in the Snowdrift Game, such that below (above) a determinate cost-to-benefit ratio, cooperation will almost surely fix (go extinct) in the population. This second result calls into question the explanatory reach of traditional continuous models and suggests a possible alternative explanation for high levels of cooperative behavior in nature.