Parliaments in the Euro Crisis: Can the Losers of Integration Still Fight Back?
Parliaments in the Euro Crisis: Can the Losers of Integration Still Fight Back?
复制标题
欧元危机中的议会：一体化的失败者还能反击吗？
DOI：
10.1111/jcms.12186
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Höing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Höing
欧元区危机挑战了各国议会的审查制度：许多应对危机的工具是在欧盟法律框架之外制定的；危机管理通常由欧洲和各国高管主导；决策是在巨大的时间压力下做出的。各国议会是否参与了对危机管理的审查？如果参与了，又是如何参与的？他们与危机相关的审查活动在多大程度上不同于欧盟其他事务？基于2010 - 2012年正式议会活动的定量数据集，本文表明，在许多国家议会的欧盟全体会议辩论中，危机确实发挥了重要作用。然而，在辩论之外，对于大多数议会来说，对危机管理的审查令人惊讶地“一如既往”。这进一步扩大了形式上强大和积极的议会与形式上软弱和不积极的议会之间的差距。
The eurozone crisis challenges the scrutiny systems of national parliaments: many instruments tackling the crisis were established outside the EU legal framework; the crisis management has generally been dominated by European and national executives; and decisions were taken under enormous time pressure. Did national parliaments become involved in scrutiny of the crisis management, and if so, how? And to what extent are their crisis‐related scrutiny activities different from those in other EU affairs? Based on a quantitative data set on formal parliamentary activities in 2010–12, this article shows that the crisis did play an important role with regard to plenary EU debates in many national parliaments. Beyond debates, however, scrutiny of the crisis management has surprisingly been ‘business as usual’ for most parliamentary chambers. This further cements the gap between formally strong and active and formally weak and inactive parliaments.