Social Cost Analysis of Shared/Buy-in Computing Systems
Social Cost Analysis of Shared/Buy-in Computing Systems
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DOI：
10.1145/3624355
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发表时间：
2023-09
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Zhenpeng Shi;D. Starobinski;Ariel Orda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhenpeng Shi;D. Starobinski;Ariel Orda
共享/购买计算系统向用户提供在购买和共享服务之间进行选择的选项。在这样的系统中，空闲的买入资源可供其他用户共享。在有策略用户的情况下，系统的资源购买和分配可以看作是一个非合作博弈，其纳什均衡不一定会导致最优的社会成本。在这项研究中，我们首先推导出封闭形式的游戏的最优社会成本，通过铸造它作为一个凸优化问题，并建立相关的属性。接下来，我们推导出一个封闭形式的表达的社会成本在纳什均衡，并表明，它可以在线性时间计算。我们进一步表明，用户的策略配置文件在最佳和纳什均衡是成正比的。我们通过无政府状态的代价来衡量纳什均衡的无效率，并表明在某些情况下，它可能相当大，例如，当运营费用率较低或当用户工作负载的分布相对均匀时。为了提高系统的效率，我们提出并分析了两个补贴政策，这是收敛使用最佳响应动态。
Shared/buy-in computing systems offer users the option to select between buy-in and shared services. In such systems, idle buy-in resources are made available to other users for sharing. With strategic users, resource purchase and allocation in such systems can be cast as a non-cooperative game, whose corresponding Nash equilibrium does not necessarily result in the optimal social cost. In this study, we first derive the optimal social cost of the game in closed form, by casting it as a convex optimization problem and establishing related properties. Next, we derive a closed-form expression for the social cost at the Nash equilibrium, and show that it can be computed in linear time. We further show that the strategy profiles of users at the optimum and the Nash equilibrium are directly proportional. We measure the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium through the price of anarchy, and show that it can be quite large in certain cases, e.g., when the operating expense ratio is low or when the distribution of user workloads is relatively homogeneous. To improve the efficiency of the system, we propose and analyze two subsidy policies, which are shown to converge using best-response dynamics.