A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium
A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium
复制标题
关于伯特兰平衡演化稳定性的注解
DOI：
10.1007/s001910050087
复制
发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
W. Leininger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Burkhard Hehenkamp;W. Leininger
结果表明，进化稳定策略（ESS）的均衡概念确实具有预测能力的标准模型的Bertrand竞争。这与Qin和Stuart（1997）最近的主张形成对比。这个主张是基于这样的观察，即当有限（离散）行动博弈在极限中接近无限（连续）行动博弈时，解概念ESS表现为不连续的。此外，有人认为，从模型理论的角度来看，价格的进化稳定性（即在伯特兰模型）是完全不同的数量的进化稳定性（即在古诺模型）。
It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves discontinuously when finite (discrete) action games approach an infinite (continuous) action game in the limit. Furthermore, it is argued that from a model-theoretic point of view evolutionary stability in prices (i.e. in the Bertrand model) is quite different from evolutionary stability in quantities (i.e. in the Cournot model).