A Scan-Based Attack Based on Discriminators for AES Cryptosystems
A Scan-Based Attack Based on Discriminators for AES Cryptosystems
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DOI：
10.1587/transfun.e92.a.3229
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发表时间：
2009-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ryuta Nara;N. Togawa;M. Yanagisawa;T. Ohtsuki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ryuta Nara;N. Togawa;M. Yanagisawa;T. Ohtsuki
扫描链是最重要的测试技术之一，但它可以用作针对密码LSI的旁道攻击。我们专注于基于扫描的攻击，其中扫描链针对侧信道攻击。传统的基于扫描的攻击仅考虑仅由密码电路中的寄存器组成的扫描链。然而，密码LSI通常使用许多电路，例如存储器、微处理器和其他电路。这意味着传统的攻击无法应用于由各类寄存器组成的实际扫描链。本文提出了一种基于扫描的攻击，该攻击能够破译由 AES 电路和其他电路组成的 AES 密码 LSI 中的密钥。通过关注特定寄存器的位模式并监视其变化，我们的基于扫描的攻击消除了 AES 以外的其他电路中包含的寄存器的影响。我们的攻击不依赖于扫描链架构，并且可以破译实用的 AES 密码学 LSI。
A scan chain is one of the most important testing techniques, but it can be used as side-channel attacks against a cryptography LSI. We focus on scan-based attacks, in which scan chains are targeted for side-channel attacks. The conventional scan-based attacks only consider the scan chain composed of only the registers in a cryptography circuit. However, a cryptography LSI usually uses many circuits such as memories, micro processors and other circuits. This means that the conventional attacks cannot be applied to the practical scan chain composed of various types of registers. In this paper, a scan-based attack which enables to decipher the secret key in an AES cryptography LSI composed of an AES circuit and other circuits is proposed. By focusing on bit pattern of the specific register and monitoring its change, our scan-based attack eliminates the influence of registers included in other circuits than AES. Our attack does not depend on scan chain architecture, and it can decipher practical AES cryptography LSIs.