Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague—the failure of global climate negotiations
Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague—the failure of global climate negotiations
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DOI：
10.1016/s0301-4215(02)00015-0
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发表时间：
2001-06
期刊：
影响因子：
9
通讯作者：
U. Brandt;G. Svendsen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
U. Brandt;G. Svendsen
海牙气候谈判为何失败？我们的贡献是认为欧盟（EU）和美国（US）之间的冲突主要源于成本问题上的分歧。我们认为欧盟在海牙提出的三个主要关切。一是50%的国家排放上限（补充原则），二是碳汇的利用，三是国际市场控制体系。这些问题可以通过取消对自由温室气体（GHG）贸易的所有限制并建立世界贸易组织作为国际权威来解决。美国将面临比京都谈判中预期高得多的成本，并将有强烈的搭便车动机。我们的主要假设是，欧盟的补充性提案使得美国转向搭便车。因此，为了让美国留在国际温室气体排放交易计划中，欧盟必须重新考虑并承认美国提出的更便宜的减排方案和“空话”交易权的主张。这一点很重要。如果美国不参与，增加的排放量将远高于欧盟补充提案后的减排量。
Why did the climate negotiations in The Hague fail? Our contribution is to argue that the conflict between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) stems mainly from disagreement on the cost issue. We argue that the three main concerns promoted by the EU in The Hague. First, a 50% national emission ceiling (the supplementarity principle), second the use of carbon sinks, and third an international market control system. These issues can be solved by removing all restrictions on free greenhouse gas (GHG) trade and by establishing the World Trade Organization as an international authority. The US will face considerably higher costs than foreseen at the negotiations in Kyoto and will have strong incentives to free ride. Our main hypothesis is that the EU proposal on supplementarity made the US turn to free riding. Thus, to make the US stay in an international GHG emission-trading scheme, the EU must reconsider and acknowledge US claims for cheaper reduction options and the right to trade ‘hot air’. This point is important. If the US does not participate, the increase in emissions will be much higher than the emission reduction following the EU supplementarity proposal.