Corporate Governance, Accounting Conservatism, and Manipulation
Corporate Governance, Accounting Conservatism, and Manipulation
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公司治理、会计保守主义和操纵
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2251378
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Laux
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Judson Caskey;V. Laux
本文建立了一个模型来分析董事会治理如何影响公司的财务报告选择，以及经理人操纵会计报告的动机。在我们的情况下，在其他条件不变的情况下，保守会计是可取的，因为它允许董事会更好地监督公司的投资决策。然而，稳健性的这一特点导致管理者操纵会计制度，误导董事会，扭曲其决策。有效的报告监督限制了管理人员的操纵能力，这增加了保守会计的好处，同时降低了成本。我们的模型预测，更强的报告监督导致更大的会计稳健性，操纵和投资效率。
We develop a model to analyze how board governance affects firms' financial reporting choices, and managers' incentives to manipulate accounting reports. In our setting, ceteris paribus, conservative accounting is desirable because it allows the board of directors to better oversee the firm's investment decisions. This feature of conservatism, however, causes the manager to manipulate the accounting system to mislead the board and distort its decisions. Effective reporting oversight curtails managers' ability to manipulate, which increases the benefits of conservative accounting and simultaneously reduces its costs. Our model predicts that stronger reporting oversight leads to greater accounting conservatism, manipulation, and investment efficiency.