Answer First: Applying the Heuristic-Analytic Theory of Reasoning to Examine Student Intuitive Thinking in the Context of Physics.

Answer First: Applying the Heuristic-Analytic Theory of Reasoning to Examine Student Intuitive Thinking in the Context of Physics.
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首先回答:应用启发式分析推理理论来检查学生在物理背景下的直觉思维。

DOI:
10.1103/physrevstper.10.020109
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发表时间:
2014
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Nathaniel Grosz
Nathaniel Grosz
中科院分区:
社会科学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Mila Kryjevskaia;M. R. Stetzer;Nathaniel Grosz

文献摘要

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我们已经应用了逻辑分析理论的推理来解释不一致的学生推理方法的物理问题。这项研究的动机是一个新兴的证据表明,学生的概念和推理能力表现在一个任务往往无法在另一个。事实上,即使经过专门设计的教学,以解决学生的概念和推理困难,确定了严格的研究,许多本科物理学生未能建立推理链的基本原则,即使他们拥有所需的知识和技能,这样做。相反,他们往往依赖于各种直观的推理策略。在这项研究中,我们开发并采用了一种方法,允许解开学生的概念理解和推理方法,通过使用相关的问题序列。我们已经证明,推理的分析主义理论可以用来解释,在一个机械的方式,观察到的学生反应的不一致。特别是,我们发现学生倾向于以选择性的方式应用他们正确的想法,支持一个具体的和可能预期的结论,而忽略了使用相同的想法来反驳一个错误的直觉结论。观察到的推理模式是一致的,根据该理论,推理者开发一个“第一印象”的心理模型,然后构建一个参数,以支持这个模型所建议的答案。我们讨论了教学的影响,并认为,努力提高学生的元认知,这有助于调节直觉和分析推理之间的相互作用,很可能会导致改善学生的推理。
We have applied the heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning to interpret inconsistencies in student reasoning approaches to physics problems. This study was motivated by an emerging body of evidence that suggests that student conceptual and reasoning competence demonstrated on one task often fails to be exhibited on another. Indeed, even after instruction specifically designed to address student conceptual and reasoning difficulties identified by rigorous research, many undergraduate physics students fail to build reasoning chains from fundamental principles even though they possess the required knowledge and skills to do so. Instead, they often rely on a variety of intuitive reasoning strategies. In this study, we developed and employed a methodology that allowed for the disentanglement of student conceptual understanding and reasoning approaches through the use of sequences of related questions. We have shown that the heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning can be used to account for, in a mechanistic fashion, the observed inconsistencies in student responses. In particular, we found that students tended to apply their correct ideas in a selective manner that supported a specific and likely anticipated conclusion while neglecting to employ the same ideas to refute an erroneous intuitive conclusion. The observed reasoning patterns were consistent with the heuristic-analytic theory, according to which reasoners develop a “first-impression” mental model and then construct an argument in support of the answer suggested by this model. We discuss implications for instruction and argue that efforts to improve student metacognition, which serves to regulate the interaction between intuitive and analytical reasoning, is likely to lead to improved student reasoning.