Bargaining and the Nature of War
Bargaining and the Nature of War
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讨价还价和战争的本质
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Stam
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alastair Smith;A. Stam
开发了嵌入随机游走战争模型的讨价还价模型。冲突模型既包含基于彩票的冲突模型，也包含基于消耗战的冲突模型。结果表明，在长期而不是短期的战争之后，未来的争端不太可能导致武装冲突。此外，如果随后的争端导致武装冲突，成本越高，以前的战争持续的时间越长，冲突可能持续的时间就越短。
A model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed. The conflict model contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict. Results show that future disputes are less likely to lead to armed conflict following long rather than short wars. Furthermore, should a subsequent dispute lead to armed conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the conflict is likely to last.