Delegation or Voting
Delegation or Voting
复制标题
授权或投票
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Visser
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
O. Swank;B. Visser
集体决策程序应该平衡它们提供的获取信息的激励和它们收集私人信息的能力。在一个决策问题中，一旦获得了关于项目质量的信息，就可以接受或拒绝项目，我们将授权结构的性能与两种投票程序的性能进行比较。从定义上讲，授权使一个人的接受决定至关重要。在投票程序中，一个人投票的决定性取决于另一个代理人的投票。这反过来又决定了获取信息的决定。在关于孔多塞陪审定理的理性选择基础的争论中，信息的分布是左同质的。需要混合（接受）策略来验证定理。正如我们所做的那样，信息获取的内因化揭示了混合（接受）策略对福利是有害的，因为它们导致了购买和不购买信息之间的冷漠。
Collective decision procedures should balance the incentives they provide toacquire information and their capacity to aggregate private information. In a decisionproblem in which a project can be accepted or rejected once information about its qualityhas been acquired or not, we compare the performance of a delegation structure with that oftwo voting procedures. Delegation makes one's acceptance decision pivotal by definition.The decisiveness of one's vote in a voting procedure depends on the other agent's vote.This in turn determines the decision to acquire information. In the debate about a rationalchoice foundation of Condorcet's Jury Theorem, the distribution of information was leftexogenous. Mixed (acceptance) strategies were required to validate the Theorem.Endogenizing information acquisition as we do reveals mixed (acceptance) strategies to bedetrimental for welfare as they lead to indifference between buying and not buyinginformation.