Mergers Among Asymmetric Bidders: A Logit Second-Price Auction Model
Mergers Among Asymmetric Bidders: A Logit Second-Price Auction Model
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非对称投标人之间的合并：Logit 二价拍卖模型
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.69415
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Crooke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Luke M. Froeb;S. Tschantz;P. Crooke
在本文中，我们推导出估计，封闭形式（非积分）的表达式，分布的出价在一个极端的价值，不对称，第二价格，私人价值拍卖。在均衡中，价格（中标）和股份（中标概率）有一个简单的单调关系--价值较高的公司比价值较低的公司更频繁地以更好的价格中标。由于极值分布在最大值函数下是封闭的，合并后的联盟的价值也具有极值分布，因此位于相同的价格/份额曲线上。因此，合并的价格效应可以计算为价格/份额曲线的沿着移动，从合并前的平均份额到合并后的总份额。决定获胜价格变化多少的参数是极值成分的标准差。合并效率索赔可以根据抵消合并价格效应所需的边际成本降低来衡量。
In this paper, we derive estimators of, and closed-form (non-integral) expressions for, the distribution of bids in an extreme value, asymmetric, second-price, private-values auction. In equilibrium, prices (winning bids) and shares (winning probabilities) have a simple monotonic relationship--higher-value firms win more frequently and at better prices than lower-value firms. Since the extreme value distribution is closed under the maximum function, the value of the merged coalition also has an extreme value distribution and thus lies on the same price/share curve. Consequently, merger price effects can be computed as a movement along the price/share curve, from the average pre-merger share to the post-merger aggregate share. The parameter determining how much winning prices change is the standard deviation of the extreme value component. Merger efficiency claims can be benchmarked against the marginal cost reductions necessary to offset merger price effects.