Justice lost! The failure of international human rights law to matter where needed most
Justice lost! The failure of international human rights law to matter where needed most
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DOI：
10.1177/0022343307078942
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发表时间：
2007-07-01
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Tsutsui, Kiyoteru
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M.;Tsutsui, Kiyoteru
国际人权条约已经得到许多民族国家的批准，包括那些由专制政府统治的国家，这为世界许多角落的更好做法带来了希望。然而，越来越多的证据表明，人权法在稳定或巩固的民主国家或民间社会积极性强的国家中最为有效。如果是这样的话，条约可能无法在那些最需要改革的国家--世界上最严重的滥用者--产生影响，尽管这些国家从一开始就是人权制度的目标。作者通过特别关注压制性国家的行为来解决这个服从问题。本文通过对两个主要人权条约影响的一系列跨国分析，表明：（1）政府，包括压制性政府，经常对人权条约作出法律的承诺，接受公认的保护准则，并为持久改革所需的社会化和能力建设创造机会;（2）这些承诺对世界上最可怕的镇压者甚至在很长一段时间内都没有影响;（3）最近的研究结果表明，条约的有效性取决于民主和公民社会，但这并不能解释世界上最滥用权力的政府的行为;（4）现实的体制改革可能无助于解决这一问题。
International human rights treaties have been ratified by many nation-states, including those ruled by repressive governments, raising hopes for better practices in many corners of the world. Evidence increasingly suggests, however, that human rights laws are most effective in stable or consolidating democracies or in states with strong civil society activism. If so, treaties may be failing to make a difference in those states most in need of reform - the world's worst abusers - even though they have been the targets of the human rights regime from the very beginning. The authors address this question of compliance by focusing on the behavior of repressive states in particular. Through a series of cross-national analyses on the impact of two key human rights treaties, the article demonstrates that (1) governments, including repressive ones, frequently make legal commitments to human rights treaties, subscribing to recognized norms of protection and creating opportunities for socialization and capacity-building necessary for lasting reforms; (2) these commitments mostly have no effects on the world's most terrible repressors even long into the future; (3) recent findings that treaty effectiveness is conditional on democracy and civil society do not explain the behavior of the world's most abusive governments; and (4) realistic institutional reforms will probably not help to solve this problem.