An index of capital tax competition
An index of capital tax competition
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资本税竞争指数
DOI：
10.1007/s10797-008-9093-9
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发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
S. Bucovetsky
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Bucovetsky
如果对生产技术（每个工人的产出是资本/劳动力比率的二次函数）、人们的偏好（在任何司法管辖区内都是相同的;人均私人物品消费和人均公共支出是线性的）和资本供应（固定的）做出非常具体的假设，那么当司法管辖区非合作地选择其基于来源的资本税率时，均衡税率可以以封闭形式导出。本文的重点是不同司法管辖区的人口规模分布如何影响均衡税率。它表明，（人口加权）平均税率是由一个（相对）简单的指数，它必须增加人口分布变得更加集中。然后可以分析某些管辖区的税收协调的影响。一组司法管辖区的任何税收协调都必须使该组以外的所有司法管辖区的居民受益。它还必须使群体中最大管辖区的居民受益，并且必须增加进行协调的管辖区群体中所有居民的平均收益。
If very specific assumptions are made about the production technology (output per worker is a quadratic function of the capital/labor ratio), people’s preferences (identical within any jurisdiction; linear in private good consumption and in public expenditure per capita), and capital supply (fixed), then equilibrium tax rates can be derived in closed form when jurisdictions choose their source-based tax rates on capital noncooperatively. The focus of this paper is how the size distribution of the population of the different jurisdictions affects equilibrium tax rates. It is shown that the (population-weighted) average tax rate is determined by a (relatively) simple index, which must increase as the population distribution becomes more concentrated. The effects of tax harmonization by some subset of the jurisdictions can then be analyzed. Any tax harmonization by a group of jurisdictions must benefit residents of all jurisdictions not in the group. It must also benefit residents of the largest jurisdiction in the group, and must increase the average payoff of all residents of the group of jurisdictions doing the harmonizing.