Tweety, or Why Probabilism and even Bayesianism Need Objective and Evidential Probabilities
Tweety, or Why Probabilism and even Bayesianism Need Objective and Evidential Probabilities
复制标题
Tweety，或者为什么概率论甚至贝叶斯主义需要客观和证据概率
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-007-3030-4_5
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Schurz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Schurz
According to probabilism, uncertain conditionals are to be reconstructed as assertions of high conditional probability. In everyday life one often encounters situations of ‘exception’. In these situations two uncertain conditionals have contradicting consequents and both of their antecedents are instantiated or true, respectively. The often cited example of this sort is ‘Tweety’, who happens to be both a bird and a penguin. We believe that if Tweety is a bird then it probably can fly, and if it is a penguin then it probably cannot fly. If one reconstructs these examples by only one probability function, as is required by strong Bayesianism, they come out as probabilistically incoherent (with or without the existence of a specificity relation between the two antecedents). This result is counterintuitive. I argue that if one intends a coherent reconstruction, one has to distinguish between two probability functions, evidential probabilities which are subjective, and objective probabilities which are backed up by statistical probabilities. Drawing on Hawthorne (2005) I give further reasons why probabilism and even Bayesianism needs this distinction. In the end of the paper I present results of an experimental study on examples of ‘exception’ which confirm that humans operate with these two distinct probability concepts.
登录
查看更多内容
累积默认逻辑：捍卫非单调推理规则
影响因子：
14.4
作者：
G. Brewka
通讯作者：
G. Brewka
心理概率逻辑中的条件
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
N. Pfeifer;G. Kleiter
通讯作者：
G. Kleiter
置信度和支持度：为什么贝叶斯学派需要这两个概念
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
James Hawthorne
通讯作者：
James Hawthorne
贝叶斯或半身像
DOI：
--
发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
J. Earman
通讯作者：
J. Earman
进化论视角下的非单调推理：本体、逻辑和认知基础
影响因子：
1.5
作者：
G. Schurz
通讯作者：
G. Schurz