Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, and True Financial Performance
Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, and True Financial Performance
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盈余管理、公司治理和真实的财务业绩
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.886142
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Saunders
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Tehranian;Marcia Millon Cornett;A. Marcus;A. Saunders
本文探讨两个问题。第一，在其他情况下影响公司行为的公司治理机制是否也会影响公司对其报告的财务业绩进行有利管理的程度？第二，过去的研究调查的影响，治理结构和期权为基础的薪酬对公司业绩的立场时，衡量业绩调整的影响，盈余管理？我们证明，公司治理机制有效地约束盈余管理的自由裁量权，并估计治理变量对公司业绩的影响要强得多时，可支配应计项目从报告的盈余。机构持股、机构投资者在董事会中的代表性以及独立外部董事在董事会中的存在都减少了盈余管理中可支配应计利润的使用。这些因素在很大程度上抵消了期权补偿的影响，我们发现期权补偿强烈鼓励盈余管理。盈余管理强烈影响公司业绩报告的模式。虽然传统的盈利能力的措施，期权报酬和公司业绩之间的关系很强，盈利能力的措施，调整的影响，可支配应计利润与期权报酬没有关系。相比之下，当从衡量的盈利能力中剔除可支配应计利润时，公司治理变量对公司业绩的估计影响增加了一倍多。
This paper addresses two questions. First, do corporate governance mechanisms that have been shown to affect firm behavior in other contexts also affect the degree to which firms advantageously manage their reported financial performance? Second, does past research investigating the impact of governance structure and option-based compensation on firm performance stand up when measured performance is adjusted for the impact of earnings management? We demonstrate that corporate governance mechanisms effectively constrain discretion in earnings management and that the estimated impact of governance variables on corporate performance is far stronger when discretionary accruals are removed from reported earnings. Institutional ownership of shares, institutional investor representation on the board of directors, and the presence of independent outside directors on the board all reduce the use of discretionary accruals in earnings management. These factors largely offset the impact of options compensation, which we find strongly encourages earnings management. Earnings management strongly affects patterns of reported corporate performance. While conventional profitability measures suggest a strong relationship between option compensation and firm performance, profitability measures that are adjusted for the impact of discretionary accruals show no relationship with option compensation. In contrast, the estimated impact of corporate governance variables on firm performance more than doubles when discretionary accruals are eliminated from measured profitability.