Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis
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宽容主义与理性的价值：对独特性命题的挑战
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Miriam Schoenfield
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Miriam Schoenfield
：近年来，放任主义--声称一系列证据可以使一种以上的反应合理化--在某种程度上复兴了。但它再次受到威胁，这一次受到一系列新的有趣论点的威胁，这些论点的核心是挑战放任主义者解释理性为什么重要。我特别感兴趣的挑战的一个版本是：如果放任主义是真的，为什么我们要指望理性的信用比非理性的信用更准确？我的目的是颠覆这一挑战，并辩称，实际上，那些否认放任主义的人比那些接受这种挑战的人更难应对这样的挑战。
: In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational credences to be more accurate than the irrational ones? My aim is to turn this challenge on its head and argue that, actually, those who deny permissivism will have a harder time responding to such a challenge than those who accept it.