Delegation and Threat in Bargaining
Delegation and Threat in Bargaining
复制标题
谈判中的授权和威胁
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0611
复制
发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Björn Segendorff
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Björn Segendorff
摘要两个委托人(“国家”)各自指定一名代理人为提供公共产品讨价还价。研究了两种机构设置，每种设置都赋予代理不同的权力级别。在这里，权威意味着如果谈判破裂，有权决定自己方的条款。在均衡中，委托人选择的代理人的偏好与他们自己的不同。低权威均衡的帕累托支配着(就主体而言)主体同时(独裁)决定条款的情况。高权威均衡是由低权威均衡主导的帕累托均衡，它甚至可能被专制主导。经济文献杂志分类编号：C71和C72。
Abstract Two principals (“nations”) appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously (autarchy). The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, and C72.