Question-begging in non-cumulative systems
Question-begging in non-cumulative systems
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非累积系统中的提问
DOI：
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发表时间：
1979
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
J. Mackenzie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Mackenzie
在他们最近的论文[A]中，J·伍兹和D·沃尔顿比较了两种关于乞求问题的谬误的方法(请愿书)。一种是他们所说的认识论方法：论点是循环的，使用它的人回避问题，如果要知道论点的某个前提的真理，一个人必须已经知道结论的真理，或者某种一般的解释。另一种方法是辩证的，即在对话方面。这种做法是在有争议的辩论中出现谬误时予以考虑的，即一名参与者要求另一名参与者给予他一个包含争议内容实质内容的前提(见Hamblin[F]，第73页)。伍兹和沃尔顿声称：
In their recent paper [A], J. Woods and D. Walton compare two approaches to the fallacy of begging the question (petitio pnizcipii). One is what they call the epistemicdoxastic approach: an argument is circular, and the person who uses it begs the question, if in order to know the truth of some premiss of the argument one must already know the truth of the conclusion, or some account of that general kind. The other approach is dialectical, that is, in terms of dialogue. This approach considers the fallacy as it arises in the context of contentious debate, when one participant asks the other to grant him a premiss which contains the substance of what is in dispute (see Hamblin [F] ,,p. 73). Woods and Walton claim that: