Cooperative Control and Potential Games
Cooperative Control and Potential Games
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DOI：
10.1109/tsmcb.2009.2017273
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发表时间：
2009-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jason R. Marden;Gürdal Arslan;J. Shamma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jason R. Marden;Gürdal Arslan;J. Shamma
我们使用游戏中学习语言展示了合作控制的观点。我们回顾了潜在和弱环保游戏的游戏理论概念，并展示了如何在这些情况下制定一些合作控制问题，例如共识和动态传感器覆盖范围。在这种联系的激励下，我们以游戏理论概念为基础，以更好地适应更广泛的合作控制问题。特别是，我们扩展了现有的学习算法，以适应由代理能力和基于群体决策的局限性引起的限制行动集。此外，我们还引入了一种新的游戏类，称为有时是弱的无环游戏，以实现时变目标功能和动作集，并提供分布式算法，以使收敛到平衡。
We present a view of cooperative control using the language of learning in games. We review the game-theoretic concepts of potential and weakly acyclic games, and demonstrate how several cooperative control problems, such as consensus and dynamic sensor coverage, can be formulated in these settings. Motivated by this connection, we build upon game-theoretic concepts to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative control problems. In particular, we extend existing learning algorithms to accommodate restricted action sets caused by the limitations of agent capabilities and group based decision making. Furthermore, we also introduce a new class of games called sometimes weakly acyclic games for time-varying objective functions and action sets, and provide distributed algorithms for convergence to an equilibrium.