Decisions and disease: a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation
Decisions and disease: a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation
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DOI：
10.1038/s41598-020-69546-2
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发表时间：
2020-08-04
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Rowlett, Julie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Karlsson, Carl-Joar;Rowlett, Julie
在许多情况下，个人可以决定是否采取行动来减缓疾病的传播。减缓疾病的传播需要个人改变他们的日常行为以造福他人，从而导致类似于开创性的囚犯困境的“疾病困境”。在经典的囚徒困境中，进化博弈动力学预测所有个体都会进化为“背叛”。“我们发现，当一个群体内的合作率与疾病的传播率直接相关时，合作在一定条件下会发展。对于那些不能使康复者获得免疫力的疾病，如果与疾病传播的时间尺度相比，个人获得关于疾病的准确信息的时间尺度足够快，那么合作就会出现。此外，在缓解措施日益有效的限度内，这种疾病是可以控制的;感染人数趋于零。有人认为，疾病传播模型也可以描述社会和群体动态，这表明这种合作进化机制也可能适用于这些背景。
In numerous contexts, individuals may decide whether they take actions to mitigate the spread of disease, or not. Mitigating the spread of disease requires an individual to change their routine behaviours to benefit others, resulting in a 'disease dilemma' similar to the seminal prisoner's dilemma. In the classical prisoner's dilemma, evolutionary game dynamics predict that all individuals evolve to 'defect.' We have discovered that when the rate of cooperation within a population is directly linked to the rate of spread of the disease, cooperation evolves under certain conditions. For diseases which do not confer immunity to recovered individuals, if the time scale at which individuals receive accurate information regarding the disease is sufficiently rapid compared to the time scale at which the disease spreads, then cooperation emerges. Moreover, in the limit as mitigation measures become increasingly effective, the disease can be controlled; the number of infections tends to zero. It has been suggested that disease spreading models may also describe social and group dynamics, indicating that this mechanism for the evolution of cooperation may also apply in those contexts.