Endogenous Presidentialism
Endogenous Presidentialism
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内生总统主义
DOI：
10.3386/w14603
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ragnar Torvik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
James A. Robinson;Ragnar Torvik
我们开发了一个模型来理解总统和议会机构的发生率。我们的分析基于两个观点：第一，与总统制相比，少数族裔在议会制中相对强大；第二，总统在自己的联盟中拥有比总理更大的权力。这些假设意味着，虽然总统制有三权分立，但它不一定比议会制有更多的制衡。我们表明，总统制意味着比议会制更大的租金提取和更低的公共产品供应。此外，如果倾向于总统主义的政治领导人担心将议程制定权力拱手让给另一个团体，他们可能会得到自己联盟的支持。我们认为，该模型与非洲和拉丁美洲有关总统主义的大量定性信息是一致的。
We develop a model to understand the incidence of presidential and parliamentary institutions. Our analysis is predicated on two ideas: first, that minorities are relatively powerful in a parliamentary system compared to a presidential system, and second, that presidents have more power with respect to their own coalition than prime ministers do. These assumptions imply that while presidentialism has separation of powers, it does not necessarily have more checks and balances than parliamentarism. We show that presidentialism implies greater rent extraction and lower provision of public goods than parliamentarism. Moreover, political leaders who prefer presidentialism may be supported by their own coalition if they fear losing agenda setting power to another group. We argue that the model is consistent with a great deal of qualitative information about presidentialism in Africa and Latin America.
总统制和议会制下的政府联盟和立法效力
DOI：
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发表时间：
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期刊：
Veto Players and Policy Change, The 1^<st> International Project Meeting. 14-15 November 2002.(Waseda University, Tokyo. Japan)
影响因子：
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作者：
Adam Przeworski
通讯作者：
Adam Przeworski