Secure k-NN query on encrypted cloud database without key-sharing
Secure k-NN query on encrypted cloud database without key-sharing
复制标题
DOI：
10.1504/ijesdf.2013.058654
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Youwen Zhu;Rui Xu;T. Takagi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Youwen Zhu;Rui Xu;T. Takagi
在云计算中，外包加密数据的安全分析是一个重要的课题。加密云数据的安全k-近邻k-近邻计算作为在线应用中的一种常用查询，受到了广泛的关注，并提出了多种解决方案。然而，大多数现有的方案假设查询用户是完全可信的，所有的查询用户知道整个密钥，这是用来加密和解密数据所有者的外包数据库。这在许多现实世界的应用中本质上是不可行的。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的安全和实用的方案，保护数据隐私和支持加密云数据的k-NN查询。该方法只向查询用户公开有限的密钥信息，即使查询用户将密钥信息泄露给攻击者，也能保护数据隐私。理论分析和实验结果证实了该方案的安全性和实用性。
In cloud computing, secure analysis on outsourced encrypted data is a significant topic. As a frequently used query for online applications, secure k-nearest neighbours k-NN computation on encrypted cloud data has received much attention, and several solutions for it have been put forward. However, most existing schemes assume the query users are fully trusted and all query users know the entire key which is used to encrypt and decrypt data owner's outsourced database. It is constitutionally not feasible in lots of real-world applications. In this paper, we propose a novel secure and practical scheme for preserving data privacy and supporting k-NN query on encrypted cloud data. In the new approach, only limited information about the key of data owner is disclosed to query users, and the data privacy can be protected even when query users leak their knowledge about the key to adversary. Theoretical analysis and experiment results confirm the security and practicality of our scheme.