Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited
Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited
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信息不对称下的人力资本投资：再论庇古猜想
DOI：
10.1086/209820
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Yijiang Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chun Chang;Yijiang Wang
本文研究了当当前雇主比潜在雇主更了解工人的生产率时，人力资本投资、劳动力流动率和工资是如何共同决定的。所得结果与标准的人力资本理论有很大的不同，或者没有被标准的人力资本理论所探索。我们发现，信息不对称会导致外部性扭曲的人力资本投资，因为更高的生产率，由于投资可能不会被市场认可。企业人力资本专用性程度越高，投资水平越高。当人力资本是一般性的时，投资不足的问题比当人力资本是企业专用性的时更为严重。
This article investigates how human capital investment, labor turnover, and wages are jointly determined when the current employer knows more about a worker's productivity than potential employers. Results derived are quite different from, or unexplored by, the standard human capital theory. We show that the information asymmetry can cause an externality distortion in human capital investment because higher productivity due to the investment may not be recognized by the market. The investment level increases in the degree of firm specificity of human capital. The underinvestment problem is more severe when human capital is general than when it is firm-specific.