Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices
Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices
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Echo TEMPEST：IEMI 引发的电子设备电磁信息泄漏
DOI：
10.1109/temc.2023.3252636
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
M. Kinugawa and Y. Hayashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Kaji;D. Fujimoto;M. Kinugawa and Y. Hayashi
电磁（EM）信息泄漏鼓励攻击，其中攻击者被动地捕获和分析由设备无意生成的EM波。通常，具有弱EM发射强度的设备不是目标。然而，即使这些设备也会受到攻击，如果它可以主动感知信息处理时发生在它们内部的电气变化。本文论证了集成电路输入/输出（I/O）电路中输入阻抗变化的主动检测所引起的信息泄漏威胁的可行性。具体地，通过从目标器件外部照射EM波来测量从IC传输信息时输入阻抗的变化。本文将该威胁标记为Echo TEMPEST。实验使用模拟IC、UART模块和USB键盘的I/O电路的评估板验证了Echo TEMPEST。研究还表明，攻击者可以根据辐射电磁波的强度控制距离（从目标设备获得信息）。此外，我们讨论了对策方法，重点是执行回声TEMPEST的条件。
Electromagnetic (EM) information leakage encourages attacks, wherein the attackers passively capture and analyze EM waves that are unintentionally generated by devices. Generally, devices with weak EM emission intensities are not targeted. However, even these devices would be subject to attacks if it becomes possible to actively sense the electrical changes that occur within them when information is processed. This article demonstrates the feasibility of the information leakage threat induced by the active sensing of input impedance changes in the input/output (I/O) circuit of an integrated circuit (IC). Specifically, the changes in the input impedance when information was transmitted from the IC, were measured by irradiating the EM waves from outside the target device. This article labels the threat as Echo TEMPEST. The experiment validated Echo TEMPEST with an evaluation board that simulated the I/O circuit of the IC, UART modules, and USB keyboards. It was also demonstrated that attackers could control the distance (obtained information from the target device), depending on the intensity of the irradiated EM waves. Furthermore, we discussed countermeasure methods focusing on the conditions for executing Echo TEMPEST.