Financial Incentives, Hospital Care, and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Fair Pricing Laws
Financial Incentives, Hospital Care, and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Fair Pricing Laws
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DOI：
10.1257/pol.20160060
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发表时间：
2017-05-01
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
Ippolito, Benedic
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Batty, Michael;Ippolito, Benedic
限制未参保患者向医院支付费用的州法律提供了一个独特的机会来研究医疗保健提供者的经济激励如何影响他们提供的护理。我们估计，这些法律将使未投保患者的付款减少 25%-30%。尽管未参保的人只占其业务的一小部分，但医院的应对措施是减少向这些患者提供的护理量，而对广泛的质量指标没有产生可衡量的影响。结果表明，医院可以而且确实根据财务考虑来制定有针对性的护理，并表明改变提供者的财务激励措施可以产生更有效的护理。
State laws that limit how much hospitals are paid by uninsured patients provide a unique opportunity to study how financial incentives of health care providers affect the care they deliver. We estimate the laws reduce payments from uninsured patients by 25-30percent. Even though the uninsured represent a small portion of their business, hospitals respond by decreasing the amount of care delivered to these patients, without measurable effects on a broad set of quality metrics. The results show that hospitals can, and do, target care based on financial considerations, and suggest that altering provider financial incentives can generate more efficient care.