Security for control systems under sensor and actuator attacks
Security for control systems under sensor and actuator attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/cdc.2012.6426811
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发表时间：
2012-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Hamza Fawzi;P. Tabuada;S. Diggavi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hamza Fawzi;P. Tabuada;S. Diggavi
研究了当传感器或执行器受到恶意攻击时线性系统的估计和控制问题。在我们之前的工作[1]中，我们研究了没有控制输入的系统，我们将估计问题表述为具有稀疏攻击向量的动态纠错问题。在本文中，我们扩展了我们的研究，并着眼于输入和控制的作用。我们首先表明，通过使用状态反馈改变系统的动态，同时（几乎）完全自由地放置系统的新极点，有可能增加系统对攻击的弹性。然后，我们看看在传感器受到攻击的情况下，使用输出反馈来稳定植物的问题，我们证明了估计和控制分离的原则是成立的。最后，除了对传感器的攻击外，我们还研究了对执行器的攻击的影响：我们描述了系统对执行器和传感器攻击的弹性，并制定了一个有效的基于优化的解码器，以估计系统在执行器和传感器受到攻击时的状态。
We consider the problem of estimation and control of a linear system when some of the sensors or actuators are attacked by a malicious agent. In our previous work [1] we studied systems with no control inputs and we formulated the estimation problem as a dynamic error correction problem with sparse attack vectors. In this paper we extend our study and look at the role of inputs and control. We first show that it is possible to increase the resilience of the system to attacks by changing the dynamics of the system using state-feedback while having (almost) total freedom in placing the new poles of the system. We then look at the problem of stabilizing a plant using output-feedback despite attacks on sensors, and we show that a principle of separation of estimation and control holds. Finally we look at the effect of attacks on actuators in addition to attacks on sensors: we characterize the resilience of the system with respect to actuator and sensor attacks and we formulate an efficient optimization-based decoder to estimate the state of the system despite attacks on actuators and sensors.