Perspective-Taking and Object Construction: Two Keys to Learning
Perspective-Taking and Object Construction: Two Keys to Learning
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观点采择和对象构建：学习的两个关键
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发表时间：
2012
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通讯作者：
E. Ackermann
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作者：
E. Ackermann
皮亚杰将智力定义为适应，或在稳定与变化之间保持平衡的能力，或者用他自己的话说，在同化与适应之间保持平衡的能力。当人们将世界同化为他们当前的知识时，他们就会将自己的秩序强加给事物。这种短暂的关闭对于构建独立于即时交互的世界的“不变量”很有用。在住宿中，人们成为关注的对象之一。这可能会导致暂时失去控制，因为融合放松了界限，但允许改变。我选择换位思考的领域来说明同化和适应之间的交替如何强调个人与世界的互动。我表明，摆脱自己的立场并接受他人观点的能力需要构建认知不变量：超越任何给定观点的世界稳定性的重塑。我的结论是，分离是构建更深层次理解的必要步骤，采用“上帝视角”并不与在世界上树立自己的立场相矛盾。 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------参考：Ackermann, E. (1996)。观点采择和对象构建。实践中的建构主义：数字世界中的设计、思考和学习（Kafai, Y. 和 Resnick, M.，编辑）。新泽西州莫瓦：Lawrence Erlbaum Associates。第 1 部分，第 1 章2. 第 25-37 页 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[本文的早期版本在皮亚杰学会第 22 届年度研讨会上发表，主题为：“亲密关系中的发展和脆弱性——对学习的重要性”，蒙特利尔，1992 年 5 月 28 日] 认知作为与世界建立联系的方式 近年来，越来越多的心理学家和认知科学家采用了认为知识本质上是存在的，因此不应脱离其构建和实现的背景（例如 Brown & Collins & Duguid，1989；Rogoff & Lave，1984；Lave & Wenger，1991）。人们对知识在环境中的存在和成长越来越感兴趣，这使得发展心理学和其他学科的许多研究人员开始关注人们与特定情况的互动和描述。他们着眼于这些交互和描述如何随着时间的推移而演变。与大多数阶段理论所暗示的相比，这种对个人路径的丰富性和多样性的强调提供了远不如大多数阶段理论所暗示的连贯的认知增长图景。它挑战了发展主义者（例如皮亚杰和科尔伯格）的普遍观点，即消除分析性思维模式必然是更高级的认知功能形式。它质疑认知增长在于从具体到抽象、从融合到分离的单向进展的观念（Ackermann，1991；Kegan，1982；Turkle 和 Papert，1991）。一些学者进一步阐述了这样的观点：通过采用“上帝视角”（一种超越任何特定观点的包罗万象的观点）将知识与经验分开，这绝不是一种更高形式的认识。在他们看来，这当然不是在所有情况下最合适的运作模式（例如 Fox-Keller，1985；Gilligan，1987；Harding，1991；Haraway，1991）。他们认为，了解就是联系，更好地了解或获得更深入的理解，就是在联系中成长（Jordan、Kaplan、Miller、Stiver、Surrey，1991）。莱夫甚至建议将学习与知识获取区分开来。对 Lave 来说，学习是就地发挥作用的能力，即成为多种实践社区中的积极参与者（Lave，1992）。所有这些方法的共同之处在于，它们将主观性、立场和背景带回到有关知识、科学和学习的讨论的中心。他们还提醒我们，事实上，人们可以发展不同的认知方式，同时保持出色的工作能力。皮亚杰和情景知识 人们可能会说，情景认知已经伴随我们很长时间了。皮亚杰告诉我们，知识不是可以传播的商品。它也不是从一端传递、编码、存储并在另一端重新应用的信息。相反，知识是经验，因为它是通过与环境的直接互动而主动构建和重建的。这个想法在很多方面与各种“情境认知”学者表达的想法相似：认识就是联系。然而，最近的说法强调，人们理解世界和自身的能力，以及逐步构建更深层次理解的能力，不能像皮亚杰那样描述。人的发展并不是一个从具体到抽象、从融合到分离、从联通到自主的平稳、渐进的过程。更仔细地观察个人思想在背景下的曲折，揭示了一幅更为复杂的图景，这需要重新定义皮亚杰认知发展的一般阶段（Ackermann，1991；Carey，1987；Karmiloff-Smith，1992）。阶段理论强调普通儿童或认知主体如何脱离具体物体和局部偶然事件的世界，越来越能够在假设世界的领域内内化行动并在精神上操纵象征性物体。虽然这是认知发展的一个重要方面，但它并没有解释以下过程：
Piaget defines intelligence as adaptation, or the ability to maintain a balance between stability and change, or, in his own words, between assimilation and accommodation. When people assimilate the world to their current knowledge, they impose their order upon things. This momentary closure is useful to build "invariants" that lend existence to the world, independent of immediate interaction. In accommodation, people become one with the object of attention. This may lead to momentary loss of control, since fusion loosens boundaries, but allows for change. I choose the domain of perspective-taking to illustrate how this alternation between assimilation and accommodation punctuate individuals' interactions with the world. I show that the ability to move away from one's own standpoint, and to take on another person's view, requires the construction of cognitive invariants: a recasting of the world's stabilities that transcends any given viewpoint. I conclude that separation is a necessary step toward the construction of a deeper understanding, and that adopting a "god's eyes view" is by no means contrary to situating one's one stance in the world. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Reference: Ackermann, E. (1996). Perspective-Taking and object Construction. In Constuctionism in Practice: Designing, Thinking, and Learning in a Digital World (Kafai, Y., and Resnick, M., Eds.). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Part 1, Chap. 2. pp. 25-37 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[A early version of this paper was presented at the 22nd Annual Symposium of the Jean Piaget Society, on the theme: "Development and Vulnerability in Close Relashionships– Importance for Learning," Montreal, May 28, 1992] Knowing as Ways of Relating to the World In recent years, an increasing number of psychologists and cognitive scientists have adopted the view that knowledge is essentially situated and thus should not be divorced from the contexts in which it is constructed and actualized (e.g. Brown & Collins & Duguid, 1989; Rogoff & Lave, 1984; Lave & Wenger, 1991). This growing interest in knowledge as it lives and grows in context has led many researchers in developmental psychology and other disciplines to focus on people's interactions with, and descriptions of, specific situations. They look at how these interactions and descriptions evolve over time. Such an emphasis on the richness and diversity of individual paths-in-context provides a far less coherent picture of cognitive growth than is suggested by most stage theories. It challenges the prevalent view among developmentalists (such as Piaget and Kohlberg) that removed, analytical modes of thought are necessarily more advanced forms of cognitive functioning. It questions the notion that cognitive growth consists in an uni-directional progression from concrete to abstract, from fusion to separation (Ackermann, 1991; Kegan, 1982; Turkle and Papert, 1991). Several scholars further elaborate on the idea that divorcing knowledge from experience, by adopting a "god's eye view"—an all encompassing view that transcends any given viewpoint—is by no means a higher form of knowing. It is certainly not, in their views, the most appropriate mode of functioning in all situations (e.g. Fox-Keller, 1985; Gilligan, 1987; Harding, 1991; Haraway, 1991). They argue that to know is to relate and that to know better, or gain deeper understanding, is to grow-in-connection (Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, Surrey, 1991). Lave went as far as to suggest that learning should be distinguished from knowledge acquisition. Learning, to Lave, is the ability to function in situ, that is, to become an active participant within a multiplicity of communities of practices (Lave, 1992). What is common to all these approaches is that they bring back subjectivity, standpoint, and context to the center of discussions about knowledge, science, and learning. They also remind us that, indeed, people can develop different ways of knowing while remaining excellent at what they do. Piaget and Situated Knowledge One could argue that situated cognition has been with us for a long time. Piaget has taught us that knowledge is not a commodity to be transmitted. Nor is it information to be delivered from one end, encoded, stored and reapplied at the other end. Instead, knowledge is experience, in the sense that it is actively constructed and reconstructed through direct interaction with the environment. This idea is similar, in many ways, to the ideas expressed by various "situated cognition" scholars: To know is to relate. However, recent claims emphasize that people's ability to make sense of their world and themselves, and to construct progressively deeper understandings, cannot be portrayed as Piaget has done. A person's development is not a smooth, incremental progression from concrete to abstract, from fusion to separation, from connectedness to autonomy. A closer look into the meanderings of individual minds in context reveals a far more complex picture, which calls for a redefinition of Piaget's general stages of cognitive development (Ackermann, 1991; Carey, 1987; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Stage theory emphasizes how the average child, or epistemic subject, becomes detached from the world of concrete objects and local contingencies, increasingly able to internalize action and to mentally manipulate symbolic objects within the realm of hypothetical worlds. While this is an important aspect of cognitive development, it does not account for the processes by