Securing ADS-B with Multi-Point Distance-Bounding for UAV Collision Avoidance
Securing ADS-B with Multi-Point Distance-Bounding for UAV Collision Avoidance
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DOI：
10.1109/mass.2019.00026
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发表时间：
2019-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zachary P. Languell;Qijun Gu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zachary P. Languell;Qijun Gu
自动相关监视-广播(ADS-B)协议正被用于无人机(UAV)，作为新兴的多无人机避碰算法的主要信息源。ADS-B缺乏安全功能，使得依赖于信息的任何过程都容易受到来自受危害和不诚实的无人机的各种威胁。这可能会导致财产的重大损失或损坏。该研究提出了一种新的距离约束方案，用于验证来自周围无人机的ADS-B广播数据中的距离和飞行轨迹。建议的方案使无人机或地面站能够识别欺诈性无人机并避免碰撞。该方案在ArduPilot SITL(Software In The Loop)模拟器中实现和测试，以验证其检测欺诈性无人机的能力。实验表明，该方案在飞行轨迹测量和攻击检测方面都达到了预期的精度。
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) protocol is being adopted for use in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as the primary source of information for emerging multi-UAV collision avoidance algorithms. The lack of security features in ADS-B leaves any processes dependent upon the information vulnerable to a variety of threats from compromised and dishonest UAVs. This could result in substantial losses or damage to properties. This research proposes a new distance-bounding scheme for verifying the distance and flight trajectory in the ADS-B broadcast data from surrounding UAVs. The proposed scheme enables UAVs or ground stations to identify fraudulent UAVs and avoid collisions. The scheme was implemented and tested in the ArduPilot SITL (Software In The Loop) simulator to verify its ability to detect fraudulent UAVs. The experiments showed that the scheme achieved desired accuracy in both flight trajectory measurement and attack detection.