The Fog of Fraud – Mitigating Fraud by Strategic Ambiguity
The Fog of Fraud – Mitigating Fraud by Strategic Ambiguity
复制标题
欺诈迷雾——通过战略模糊性减少欺诈
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Wambach
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Matthias Lang;A. Wambach
大多数保险公司很少公布关于保险欺诈发生和发现的数据。这与以前关于昂贵的状态验证的文献形成鲜明对比，后者表明，最佳的方法是采用审计策略。可信地公布彻底审计的索赔报告是一种强大的威慑。然而，我们表明，欺诈检测的不确定性可以是一种有效的策略，以阻止模棱两可的代理人报告虚假的保险索赔。此外，如果保险公司的审计成本是异质的，那么最好不要承诺，因为承诺欺诈检测策略消除了审计的模糊性。因此，战略模糊可以是市场的均衡结果。即使是竞争也不会迫使企业提供相关信息。这一发现也适用于其他审计环境，如税务执法。
Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy. The credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports is a powerful deterrent. Yet, we show that uncertainty about fraud detection can be an effective strategy to deter ambiguity-averse agents from reporting false insurance claims. If, in addition, the auditing costs of the insurers are heterogeneous, it can be optimal not to commit, because committing to a fraud-detection strategy eliminates the ambiguity about auditing. Thus, strategic ambiguity can be an equilibrium outcome in the market. Even competition does not force firms to provide the relevant information. This finding is also relevant in other auditing settings, like tax enforcement.