Legislator Turnout and the Calculus of Voting: The Determinants of Abstention in the U.S. Congress
Legislator Turnout and the Calculus of Voting: The Determinants of Abstention in the U.S. Congress
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立法者投票率和投票计算：美国国会弃权的决定因素
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mitchell S. Sanders
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Rothenberg;Mitchell S. Sanders
投票率和投票率取决于投票的收益和成本的相互作用，这是公共选择中最长久的信念之一。收益和成本之间的相互作用通常是在选举投票率的背景下研究的，但是这些结果被这样一个事实所混淆，即参与这种选举是一种低成本，低收益的活动。对参与者的潜在回报和成本更大的立法机构投票的分析更有希望。在最近的第104届国会（1995-1996）期间，众议院。我们分析了所有有争议的点名在这两年期间，使用负二项计数模型，占立法者异质性，以确定哪些因素与这些选票诱导投票率。我们的研究结果表明，虽然投票率是可预测的，但其主要解释并不在于我们对预期收益的标准计算。我们发现，点名备选方案的意识形态两极分化并不是投票率的一个非常重要的因素，更引人注目的是，与过去的分析相反，任何特定立法者成为关键人物的可能性完全无关。相反，最重要的是，当环境因素迫使他们在竞选和立法之间做出选择时，相当多的国会议员决定不投票。因此，虽然我们的研究结果不足以引发一个完整的“国会投票悖论”类似于大众投票，他们确实表明，参与国会最严重地取决于因素以外的愿望影响的结果。
The belief that turnout and abstention depend on theinteraction of the benefits and costs of voting is oneof the longest held in public choice. The interplaybetween benefits and costs has typically been studiedwithin the context of voter turnout in elections, butthese results are confounded by the fact thatparticipation in such elections is a low-cost, low-benefit activity. Analysis of voting in legislatures,where the potential returns and costs to participantsare greater, is more promising.This paper examines participation on roll calls in theU.S. House of Representatives during the recent 104thCongress (1995–1996). We analyze all contested rollcalls during this two-year period, using a negativebinomial count model that accounts for legislatorheterogeneity, to determine what factors associatedwith such votes induce turnout. Our results suggestthat, while turnout is predictable, its primaryexplanation does not lie with our standard calculationof expected benefits. We find that the ideologicalpolarization of the roll call alternatives is not avery important factor for turnout and, even morestrikingly and contrary to what past analysis hasimplied, the likelihood of any given legislator beingpivotal is completely irrelevant. Rather, what is mostimportant is that a non-trivial number of members ofCongress decide not to vote when contextual factorsforce them to choose between electioneering andlegislating. Consequently, while our results are notsufficient to induce a full-fledged ``paradox ofcongressional voting'' analogous to that of massvoting, they do indicate that participation inCongress depends most heavily on factors beyond adesire to affect the outcome.