Designing Mechanisms for E-Commerce Security: An Example from Sealed-Bid Auctions
Designing Mechanisms for E-Commerce Security: An Example from Sealed-Bid Auctions
复制标题
电子商务安全设计机制：以密封投标拍卖为例
DOI：
10.1080/10864415.2001.11044238
复制
发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Andrew Whinston
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wenli Wang;Z. Hidvégi;Andrew Whinston
使用电脑科技是加强电子贸易保安的必要方法，但并不充分。它应该通过应用经济机制来设计电子流程来补充，以阻止对安全弱点的利用。在传统商业中运行良好的机制应该更新，以适应电子商务中出现的新问题，例如缺乏身份验证。作为一个例子，thizezs的研究重点是在线拍卖机制，并开发了一种用于多单元密封竞价拍卖的水平分割集（LPS）协议。LPS防止在线假名竞标，即竞标者通过在虚假身份下将他们的大捆投标分成几个小捆来增加他们的效用。
The use of computing technology is a necessary but not sufficient approach to enhancing e-commerce security. It should be supplemented by the application of economic mechanisms to design e-processes that discourage the exploitation of security weaknesses. Mechanisms that function well in traditional commerce should be updated to accommodate new problems raised in e-commerce, such as the lack of authentication. As an illustration, thiezezs research focuses on on-line auction mechanisms and develops a Leveled Partition Set (LPS) protocol for multi-unit sealed-bid auctions. LPS prevents on-line false-name bidding whereby bidders increase their utility by splitting their bids for a large bundle to several smaller bundles under false identities.