Private Authentication
Private Authentication
复制标题
私人认证
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Abadi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Abadi
通常，两个主体之间的通信会向第三方透露他们的身份和存在。即使使用安全协议，这些隐私泄露也可能发生;事实上，它们甚至可能是由安全协议引起的。但是，如果谨慎一些，安全协议可以为希望通信的主体提供身份验证，同时保护它们免受第三方的监视。本文讨论了私有认证问题，提出了两个移动的主体的私有认证协议。特别是，我们的协议允许两个移动的校长通信时，他们在一个位置，如果他们希望这样做，没有被第三方跟踪的危险。这些协议没有做出（可疑的）假设，即当事人共享一个长期的秘密，或者他们从无处不在的在线权威机构的基础设施中获得帮助。
Frequently, communication between two principals reveals their identities and presence to third parties. These privacy breaches can occur even if security protocols are in use; indeed, they may even be caused by security protocols. However, with some care, security protocols can provide authentication for principals that wish to communicate while protecting them from monitoring by third parties. This paper discusses the problem of private authentication and presents two protocols for private authentication of mobile principals. In particular, our protocols allow two mobile principals to communicate when they meet at a location if they wish to do so, without the danger of tracking by third parties. The protocols do not make the (dubious) assumption that the principals share a long-term secret or that they get help from an infrastructure of ubiquitous on-line authorities.