Are knowledge- and belief-reasoning automatic, and is this the right question?
Are knowledge- and belief-reasoning automatic, and is this the right question?
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知识和信念推理是自动的吗？这是正确的问题吗？
DOI：
10.1017/s0140525x20001880
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Surtees ADR
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Surtees ADR
Phillips等人。得出结论，现有证据支持知识推理，但不支持信念推理，因为这是自动的。对于一个可能没有明确答案的问题，我们提出了四个原因：(I)知识和信念可能不完全等同于感知状态，(Ii)对心理状态的敏感性不需要表征，(Iii)自动性不是单一的范畴特征，以及(Iv)我们如何表征他人的心灵取决于社会语境。比较知识和信念表征提供了一个令人信服的描述，这将显著影响未来的研究。Phillips等人。正确地指出，关于成人信念和知识表征的自动性的研究是有争议的。我们仍然怀疑，知识与信念的表征是否会被巧妙地归类为自动或非自动。为了说明这一点，我们考虑了菲利普斯等人的S推理的四个方面。
Phillips et al. conclude that current evidence supports knowledge-, but not belief-reasoning as being automatic. We suggest four reasons why this is an oversimplified answer to a question that might not have a clear-cut answer:(i) knowledge and beliefs can be incompletely equated to perceptual states,(ii) sensitivity to mental states does not necessitate representation,(iii) automaticity is not a single categorical feature, and (iv) how we represent others minds is dependent on social context.The target article makes an important theoretical contribution. Comparing knowledge and belief representation provides a compelling account that will shape future research significantly. Phillips et al. rightly note that research on the automaticity of adult belief and knowledge representation is contentious. We remain sceptical that knowledge vs. belief representation will ever neatly classify as automatic or not. We consider four aspects of Phillips et al.’s reasoning to illustrate this point.